Amid US administration initiatives to achieve a peace agreement with the aggressor country Russia, Washington has suggested that Ukraine faces a military defeat, that the front could collapse, and therefore should be more accommodating. In reality, there are no objective grounds for such conclusions. Under what conditions could the battlefield situation truly shift in favor of Ukraine? If Russia experiences unforeseen negative events, if Western aid to Ukraine significantly increases, and if the country resolves its army staffing issues.
Source: OBOZREVATEL
When planning aid to Ukraine, the European Commission indicated a projected end of the war by the end of 2026. Is this realistic? Much depends on US President Donald Trump, who has leverage over both Ukraine and Russia. Unfortunately, regarding the aggressor country, he uses it very rarely and inconsistently. Additionally, it is clear that the Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin has no intention of signing a peace deal without achieving his minimum objectives. Still, the likelihood of the war ending in 2026 does exist.
– US Army Secretary Dan Driscoll, presenting a peace plan to Ukraine, warned of the “looming threat of defeat.” A common argument of the Trump administration is that Russia holds an advantage in the war. Based on your assessment, is there really a threat of Ukraine’s defeat?
– First, it is important to understand that there are different levels of awareness among those relying on open sources versus those with access to broader information – I mean awareness of both Ukraine’s and Russia’s capabilities. Regarding what the US administration representative said, it is also important to understand the context. It might have been an emotional statement to appear more convincing to interlocutors. Various techniques are used in negotiations.
But what exactly does he mean by defeat? Which forecasts are they relying on? I do not know. But we can note certain trends observable from open sources over the last two years, since autumn 2023, when Ukraine’s offensive failed. Since then, Russia has been conducting a slow, creeping advance. Russia is gradually capturing territory, but resources on both sides are depleting – an important point.
If Ukrainian resources deplete faster than Russia’s, meaning Ukraine’s position worsens in this mutual attrition, those making assessments may conclude that over the next two years, the trend will either continue or slightly worsen – in an optimistic scenario. In a pessimistic one, it could become much worse.
Clearly, if nothing changes significantly – theoretically, serious changes could happen in Russia, but for the next ten months at least, Russia has the resources to continue the war as it is – then for improvement, something must change in Ukraine.
There are two factors. First is Western aid. If it remains at the current level, there is no reason for optimism; if it decreases, there is cause for pessimism. Second, Ukrainians themselves can take measures to improve the situation. These primarily concern mobilization and army staffing, meaning it depends on Ukrainian leadership.
By the way, regarding US aid, much depends on Trump. If negative trends for Ukraine continue long-term, the situation could worsen, which may form the basis for predictions of defeat – that the front will collapse, and so on. But I have no grounds or tools to speak in those terms.
– Similarly, can we speak in terms of total defeat for the aggressor country, Russia?
– When making such assessments, regardless of the party, one cannot wish reality into existence. Currently and in the coming months, there are no prerequisites for Russia’s defeat on the battlefield. For Russia to be defeated, some absolutely unpredictable and shocking internal events would have to occur, leading to the collapse of its army – politically, through a change in leadership. A hint of this occurred during Prigozhin’s mutiny, which, however, ended in nothing. Nothing of the sort is currently expected, although anything can happen in life. So, we are talking about battlefield defeat.
The current capabilities of the Ukrainian army are insufficient to defeat Russia on the battlefield. Conversely, the main task is to maintain a relatively stable defense, which is not always possible.
– Western analysts note that Russia is steadily increasing missile production, including long-range missiles. Ukraine has its missile program and joint programs with Europeans, but this is clearly insufficient to achieve parity. How critical is this for Ukraine and Europe?
– I would not use the term “parity.” It’s not about how many missiles you have versus the enemy. First, you need to have a sufficient quantity and quality of missiles with the necessary tactical and technical characteristics to meet minimum objectives.
Currently, Ukraine does not have enough long-range missiles, whether cruise or ballistic – I mean hundreds to a thousand kilometers or more – to inflict critical damage on Russia, only painful “pricks.”
A key factor is mutual deterrence. When you have many effective long-range strike systems, such as ballistic cruise missiles, the adversary understands the price of strikes and may find it too high. This factor could play a significant role if Ukraine had missiles in sufficient numbers and quality.
Regarding Europe, it is not at war. What do these missiles mean for Europe? If war occurs, circumstances would change. In terms of threat, Russian missiles and drones pose a danger, but the NATO bloc has effective countermeasures beyond Russia’s reach. One should not underestimate NATO capabilities.
Regarding the number of Russian missiles, it is certainly significant, though recent figures – 2,500 ballistic and cruise missiles per year – seem somewhat doubtful to me. I have no proof, but I believe the real numbers are somewhat lower.
– The European Commission plans military aid to Ukraine next year and assumes the war could end by the end of 2026. How realistic is this?
– Without insider knowledge, these considerations are fairly plausible. The war has lasted almost four years – a fact. Assuming it may continue for another two years is not overly bold. On the other hand, political efforts for potential negotiations have intensified sharply.
Yes, there are, to put it mildly, serious problems with peace plans and negotiations, but this creates an atmosphere of relative proximity. In reality, a peace agreement requires the consent of both sides, each concluding it is better to end the war under some scenario rather than continue. This is very difficult because, as I understand, Putin needs to achieve his minimum objectives. Of course, Ukrainians have no intention of conceding, as far as reality allows.
However, the United States has significant tools, one of which is pressure on Ukraine. There is also an instrument of influence on Russia, which has been used very rarely and inconsistently. Much depends on the Americans. So anything is possible, and theoretically the war could last a long time. On the other hand, with just over a year until the end of 2026, intuitively I assess that there is indeed a possibility the war could end by that time.
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