Despite the fact that the resources of the aggressor state, Russia, are being exhausted — Soviet-era equipment stockpiles are running out, production cannot keep up with the needs of the front, and there is a shortage of manpower — the balance of forces in recent months still remains in its favor. The Ukrainian army is also facing a number of problems. Moscow continues its slow advance, aiming to seize the Ukrainian-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
Source: OBOZREVATEL
The future of the war depends on Ukraine’s ability to solve internal mobilization issues and receive faster and larger Western support. Effective military assistance combined with increased economic pressure on the aggressor could deprive the Kremlin of any hope of success and push it toward negotiations.
Russia is theoretically capable of opening a second front in Europe, but in reality this is extremely unlikely. Although a hybrid war against the West is already underway, real combat against NATO countries would be a suicidal move: all of the Kremlin’s resources are concentrated in Donbas. Russia is throwing everything into battle — from old equipment to prisoners and mercenaries from exotic countries. Even limited operations like the assault on Pokrovsk stretch out for a year and a half. In this situation, attacking a stronger opponent like NATO seems irrational.
– President Zelensky said that it is not excluded that Russia might open a second front in Europe before the war in Ukraine ends. In your assessment, does the aggressor state Russia truly have the resources today to fight on two fronts at once — to open another front against a NATO country in Europe?
– First of all, in politics and world history, some things have appeared unpredictable and illogical. So I cannot guarantee anything one hundred percent — that would be foolish. But in the current situation, as I see it, hostilities could theoretically flare up — such a probability exists.
Putin and Russia are waging a hybrid war against Europe; there is a Cold War atmosphere, and actions that could theoretically lead to escalation. But we must distinguish between the Cold War atmosphere, hybrid warfare, sabotage, various actions in different spheres — and the actual intention to start a war.
Starting another war now, when all efforts of Putin and Russia are aimed at capturing Donetsk region and small parts of other regions… moreover, when literally all resources are being thrown in — from old tanks taken from the Mosfilm studio to criminals released from prisons and foreign third-rate mercenaries from strange countries…
At a time when the city of Pokrovsk has been under assault for almost a year and a half, it is simply not a good moment to attack a stronger opponent — much stronger than Russia — if we are talking about NATO. Right now, they simply have no capacity for anything else, though incidents or provocations may occur.
As for what may happen later, the situation remains similar, with one exception: if Putin suddenly becomes convinced that, say, Lithuania or Estonia would not receive help — that NATO would fail to fulfill its obligations — then Russia might attempt to achieve a small territorial success without a large-scale war. But I think that would be a serious mistake.
– Could an attack by Russia on a European country theoretically benefit Ukraine in terms of support from allies? President Zelensky often stresses that Russia is far more dangerous than it appears in the West.
– In international relations, in matters of war and peace, everything is cynical — everyone primarily cares about themselves. This is normal. Therefore, theoretically, if Russia attacked NATO countries now and a war between NATO and Russia began, of course this would benefit Ukraine — very much so. This is obvious from historical parallels. But such a scenario is extremely unrealistic.
Regarding the claim that Western countries underestimate the Russian threat — I partially agree. On the one hand, the perception of Russia as a threat has clearly increased in recent years. On the other hand, some countries still do not feel it acutely enough. From a pragmatic viewpoint, for their own security — besides moral considerations — it would be more correct for European countries to provide more aid to Ukraine. But many do not perceive the situation with sufficient urgency. Only the Baltic states and perhaps Poland act as if it is their own war. Many others do not. As a result, the motivation to help exists but is not strong enough.
Thus, aid is very large but stretched over time. If it had been provided more quickly and concentrated, the result would certainly have been better. Interestingly, the total amount of aid might even have been smaller — because concentrated support over a year and a half can be more effective than four and a half years of slow assistance.
– You mentioned that today Russia is throwing all its resources into the war — “Mosfilm tanks,” criminals, etc. What resources does the aggressor state still have? Do you think Russia has enough manpower, for example, to fully occupy Donetsk region within its administrative borders? Do you see signs that their resources are running out?
– All resources would mean full mobilization and complete subordination of the economy to the needs of the war. Russia is not taking such drastic steps, but it is spending enormous resources, including its accumulated Soviet-era stockpiles. Ammunition, equipment, and weapons have been largely depleted; production cannot keep up with the needs of several key areas. Without full mobilization, they face major manpower problems.
The recruitment of third-rate mercenaries that has been ongoing for months is a clear sign of this problem. Their inability to advance more actively and on a larger number of sections of the front is another clear sign.
For example, the pressure near Dobropillia proved insufficient, and the Russians were unable to develop the momentum they had in August.
But the problem here is that both sides must be compared. They are facing difficulties, and often it is hard for them to replenish losses, although, clearly, in the medium term they replenish more than they lose. The problem is that Ukraine is also experiencing very serious challenges with manpower and replenishment. There is an acute shortage of personnel and other issues. And despite all of Russia’s problems, this balance has remained in Russia’s favor for many months.
If the size of the Ukrainian army — especially its combat units — decreases in parallel with Russia’s or increases in parallel but without shifting the balance, then the Russians can afford to continue advancing in the way they have been for the last two years since autumn 2023. We see that during this period the negative trend persists — sometimes more sharply, sometimes less sharply. At times the Russian army captures something very slowly; sometimes there are local collapses of the front, for example near Avdiivka, the breakthrough near Ocheretyne, Selydove, Kurakhove, when they manage to advance further — and accordingly, this tendency does not change.
If we assume that the trend does not change and the war continues for a long time, then it can be concluded that they will slowly “bite off” territory, but this may take a lot of time. On the one hand, there are examples like Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk, which have been under assault for a very long time. On the other hand, there is the breakthrough near Ocheretyne.
But overall, I think Putin hopes that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will at least partially collapse somewhere, that within the next six months to a year he will, in any case, be able to capture a significant portion of the minimum he wants — the rest of Donetsk region plus some other territories. If he decides that it is “enough,” then he may allow himself to move to negotiations.
And here the issue has two aspects. The first is more effective actions by the Ukrainian army on the front, and for this it is necessary to solve problems with mobilization, staffing, and combat training. This would reduce Putin’s hopes for success. And, of course, more large-scale Western assistance is needed. This would add capabilities to the Ukrainian army in another dimension and create more problems for Putin. And naturally, economic pressure is important. We can already see hints of it — the Trump administration has imposed certain significant sanctions against Russia. The general idea is this: strong economic pressure leads to Russia having less money to wage war, and the standard of living in the country declines. Theoretically — though not necessarily in practice — this should lead to the enemy having fewer resources and becoming more willing to compromise.
Accordingly, if all these levers and factors were implemented to a noticeable extent, the same willingness to negotiate and make certain compromises would appear with greater probability.
But for now, worrying trends remain. Despite the fact that Russia’s advance is very slow, it is still happening. It is worth analyzing what has happened over these two years — how much territory the enemy has managed to capture, where failures occurred and where successes were achieved — and drawing conclusions, for example, for the next two years.
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