The biggest failures of the Russian occupying army and the occupying country, Russia, in 2025 were colossal losses on the front, rather modest territorial gains that were incomparably small compared to plans, and the exhaustion of the Russian economy. However, the enemy continued, albeit slowly, the offensive as well as the attrition of Ukraine.
Source: OBOZREVATEL
Regarding the successes of the Ukrainian army, these include a number of successful operations that inflicted significant damage on the enemy, such as “Spiderweb.” The defense was quite strong along almost all front lines, preventing the enemy from making substantial advances. At the same time, as before, there remains a need for mobilization and more effective organizational measures. In addition, the country’s economy has still not been shifted to a more military-focused footing.
What is the most realistic forecast for 2026? If the situation does not change significantly, particularly in terms of military aid from Europe and the USA, Ukraine will continue to lose territory. To reverse the situation, a substantial increase in allied assistance, strengthened mobilization, or increased efficiency of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is necessary. Ideally, all three components should be implemented together.
– If we summarize 2025, in your assessment, what can be considered the biggest failures and the biggest successes of Putin and the Kremlin this year?
– As I see it, it is important how they themselves interpret and assess the situation. History, including contemporary wars, shows many cases where parties evaluate successes or failures using different criteria. This is the root of many problems.
For example, when Israelis look at wars or situations firsthand, they use their own criteria, not the opponent’s. The same applies here. For example, regarding Russia’s losses in 2025, even without knowing exact figures but understanding the basics, we know they are colossal. From the perspective of most countries, especially Western ones, these losses are absolutely unbearable. From Putin’s perspective, however, they were apparently acceptable for the price and the objective he was trying to achieve.
So we see different criteria, and our assessments of their successes or failures may not fully coincide with how they themselves evaluate the situation. This is very important.
Now, regarding failures. As I see it, in terms of Russia’s failures, two points stand out. First, the very large losses. We know from various sources (not just Ukrainian reports), from fully verified and indirect information, that Russia’s losses this year were very high and that the size of its forces has not increased significantly.
We hear from both Putin and the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander, General Syrsky, about roughly 700,000, a figure that has remained stable for quite some time. They have not been able to significantly increase the size of their forces despite costly conscriptions. They suffer very heavy losses. I don’t think this was considered a good outcome when they started the year. That’s the first point.
Second, I assume they expected greater territorial success, both in terms of area and in terms of front collapses and capturing large settlements, though we again lack formal confirmation. I find it hard to imagine that the Russians expected to capture Pokrovsk, which they reached at the end of last summer, by the end of 2025.
These, in my view, are the two main points. Of course, there are various local failures, such as Operation “Spiderweb,” which was a failure for Russian security forces and a success for the Ukrainian operation planners. Other significant episodes exist, but these are more local and tactical.
Regarding successes, I assume they consider the continuation of the Russian initiative and the slow advance with the ongoing exhaustion of Ukraine and Ukrainian resources as a success. This trend persisted in 2025, and Ukraine received less aid over the year, as the USA changed its approach. It is also likely that political forces in Europe that are not in favor of continued or increased aid to Ukraine are strengthening. So, in this strategic sense, regarding aid to Ukraine, I think Putin sees some success. He also sees success in the Russian army continuing to capture territory and employing a squeezing tactic.
In terms of negotiations and in general, we can see that despite serious depletion of economic resources—which, by the way, can also be listed among failures—Putin can afford to continue and still has prospects for either further territorial gains or success through negotiations. This covers the general strategic aspects.
– Now let’s look at the failures and successes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
– Let’s start with failures. Ukrainians continued to lose territory and repeatedly suffered heavy losses. The trend could not be reversed, and some measures that could have been taken—both mobilization and organizational—were not implemented. In my view, not all possible steps were taken to increase the quantity and quality of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The same can be said about shifting the economy to a more military footing. There is still work to be done in both areas. However, it is not too late to take steps, especially since the positive effects of these measures may not appear immediately.
Yes, the negative is that the trend could not be stopped. This occurred against the backdrop of external aid to Ukraine not significantly increasing, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
On the other hand, there are positives. This includes Operation “Spiderweb” and more effective strikes on Russian rear objects than before. These are certainly successes, though at a lower level. At a more global level, despite the losses mentioned earlier, an important success is that Ukraine lost only a small amount of territory. On most front lines, the defense was very strong, and the enemy, despite advances and miscalculations, suffered very heavy losses and most likely did not achieve its territorial plans for the year. The enemy is also being exhausted.
The fact that Ukraine maintains a strong defense and that even local failures in certain areas of the front did not lead to catastrophic consequences is, in my view, also a success. Could some measures have been better executed given available resources, both militarily and in leadership? I think so, but this does not negate serious achievements. I can only hope that next year will see more correct decisions and, accordingly, more successes.
– In your opinion, what are the pessimistic, optimistic, and realistic forecasts for the war in Ukraine in 2026?
– First, let’s put aside the political component, negotiations, and the scenario in which they yield results. Let’s assume the negotiations do not succeed. This scenario cannot be ruled out. It means the war continues.
If we assume that the Americans do not worsen their approach in terms of what they provide Ukraine, and Europe also does not worsen its support, the situation is generally unfavorable. Ukraine faces a shortage of personnel on the front, while the enemy, despite heavy losses, slowly continues to advance. To reverse this trend, either the West must provide more aid, or the Ukrainian Armed Forces must grow in size and effectiveness. Depending on whether there is positive progress in these areas, Ukraine may or may not be able to improve this negative trend.
Overall, based on last year’s experience, and assuming no improvement next year, in the coming months we will likely see a similar situation: an offensive with attempts to push on certain front lines, slow territorial losses. This is the realistic scenario.
The pessimistic scenario would arise if a negative event occurs on the front, making the situation worse than this slow deterioration. As for the optimistic scenario, what can be said? Without assuming sudden changes in leadership, for example in Russia, which are unpredictable, optimism would only occur if Western aid increases, the Ukrainian army grows in size, command operates more effectively, or all these happen together. How likely this optimistic scenario is, each person can judge for themselves.
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