Illia Novikov is a lawyer, legal expert, and partner at the law firm “Barristers” in Ukraine. In 2015, he became the first foreigner to obtain a Ukrainian attorney’s license. In 2017, he founded “Barristers” with offices in Kyiv and Odesa. In Ukraine, he is known for defending Nadiya Savchenko, Oleg Sentsov, and sailors captured in the Kerch Strait. Since 2019, he has been representing Petro Poroshenko in several criminal cases. Since 2021, he has lived in Ukraine, applied for citizenship, analyzes legal aspects of the war in the media, and speaks at international human rights conferences.
Source: Bukvy
Following the examination conducted by the DBR, it concluded that the actions of Yanukovych and Poroshenko allegedly contributed to Russian aggression. You call this examination a potential “verdict” that the court could simply copy. At the same time, the examination was carried out with a number of violations, from the formulation of questions to the selection of experts. Does this indicate that the investigation is aware of the lack of judicial prospects in this case and is focused on its “media” aspect?
– What steps does Petro Poroshenko’s defense plan to take given the prosecution’s chosen strategy?
– The more people know that this case exists and what is happening in it, the better. In 2025, the former prosecutor under Yanukovych investigates that Poroshenko is allegedly guilty in the Kharkiv agreements and that he supposedly manipulated Yanukovych. This story compromises Zelensky, not Poroshenko, so for us the best course is to simply let the investigation do whatever it wants and only inform the public. So far, the investigation hasn’t disappointed us: each of their new steps is more scandalous than the previous.
– How do you assess the fact that three of the four experts (Oleksandr Kozlov, Serhiy Polyukhovych, and Roman Momot) who signed the conclusion resigned from the Scientific Research Center for Forensic Expertise shortly after completing their work?
– Of course, there’s a temptation to immediately say: “Oh, see, they resigned because they understand they did something wrong and it will end badly for them.” In reality, we shouldn’t say that because we know nothing about their motives or relationships. If any of them want to comment, we will listen.
– How is Poroshenko’s appeal against the sanctions imposed by the Presidential Decree of 13.02.2025, based on the “coal case” and the Kharkiv agreements, progressing, and is it related to criminal case № 62023000000000007?
– The case is progressing slowly; the court still hasn’t received the central documents — the draft sanctions from the Cabinet, discussed at the NSDC, and the transcript of the NSDC meeting on February 12. At the last hearing, it was revealed that some documents submitted to the court as supposedly preparatory materials were signed after Zelensky had already signed the sanctions decree and were not submitted to the NSDC that day — effectively, a forgery. All substantive questions are answered with “this information is for official use only,” including simple ones like “How does depriving Poroshenko of state awards serve Ukraine’s national interests and security?”
The absurdity has reached the point where the Cabinet filed a motion for the court to request the transcript of the Cabinet meeting from the Cabinet Secretariat — because this is also a “DSK” document and they allegedly have no right to provide it to the court on their own initiative.
Regarding the connection between the Kharkiv agreements and the sanctions — in the letter from the head of the State Financial Monitoring Service, Pronin, who is now under pressure due to corruption accusations and from whom the sanctions procedure started, it is stated: “Investigators are examining Poroshenko P.O.’s possible active participation in the informational and legal legitimation of the Kharkiv agreements, which he publicly called ‘the art of compromise.’ According to the investigation, these actions by Poroshenko P.O. pursued a personal material (economic) motive to maintain economic relations with Russia for personal profit, including under unfavorable conditions that threaten the state of Ukraine.”
However, this is not case № 62023000000000007, which Yablonsky is handling and for which the examination was conducted. This is another case, opened in 2019, from the group of cases managed by the late Andriy Portnov. In January 2025, a month before the sanctions were implemented, a newspaper associated with Portnov wrote that sanctions against Poroshenko would be imposed under this pretext: “Regarding former President and current MP Petro Poroshenko, NSDC sanctions may be introduced for promoting the Kharkiv agreements and financing the Russian army” — January 4. “P. Poroshenko actively participated in the informational and legal legitimation of the Kharkiv agreements, publicly calling them ‘the art of compromise’” — January 31. Compare this with what Pronin signed on February 12.
Overall, we have the impression that there is a certain state-driven agenda to accuse Poroshenko regarding the Kharkiv agreements, and Yablonsky and Portnov at some stage led competing “design bureaus” — each “selling” their project on this topic within their means and resources.
– What are the next steps in criminal case № 62023000000000007, investigated by the DBR, and do you expect new expert evaluations or witness interrogations related to the Kharkiv agreements negotiations?
– We do not see this case as a source of threat, but as an opportunity to show society who and what we are dealing with — at the level of the DBR and the Office of the President.
– Do you see a connection between the progress of this case and declining public trust in the authorities? How justified are the assumptions about using criminal prosecution to distract from crises in the country, which appear in social survey reports?
– This is not an assumption; it is a fact. The suspicion against Poroshenko in the “coal case” appeared in December 2021 amid government assurances that US intelligence was mistaken and an invasion would not occur. Zelensky’s rating also noticeably declined at that time.
– What is the position of Ukraine’s international partners regarding opposition persecution? Are you aware of any attempts at non-public communication with the Ukrainian authorities on this matter?
– Publicly, there are official documents from the European Parliament and the EU Commissioner for Human Rights clearly stating that this is opposition persecution, not something else. They are published, anyone can see them. This is very serious; Europeans do not use such words lightly toward a country at war.
Regarding non-public communication, I can only say that it exists. That’s why it’s non-public. But everyone who needs to know, knows.
– How do you assess the long-term consequences of this case for Ukrainian democracy and the principle of power rotation? Does it not set a precedent for persecuting former presidents by their political opponents?
– I lived in Moscow in the 2000s and remember well how Putin gradually transformed from “a bit authoritarian in methods, but overall tolerates the opposition, doesn’t imprison anyone for no reason” to what he is now. We shouldn’t comfort ourselves thinking such a transformation is only possible there, and that Ukraine supposedly has innate immunity.
As for setting a precedent for persecuting former presidents — this should primarily concern Zelensky himself. Poroshenko has lived and worked under these conditions for six years; he is used to it. After leaving office, Zelensky will have to experience firsthand whether the legal system he and the parliamentary majority created can protect against political persecution.
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